Generic Competition and Market Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals by Grabowski, Henry & Kyle, Margaret
 1 
GENERIC COMPETITION AND  
MARKET EXCLUSIVITY PERIODS 
IN PHARMACEUTICALS* 
 
 
Henry Grabowski and 
Margaret Kyle 
Department of Economics 
and 
Fuqua School of Business 
Duke University 
Durham, NC  27708 
 
May 2006 
*This project was supported by grants from PhRMA and the Duke University Program in 
Pharmaceuticals and Health Economics.  The research design and analysis for the project 
was performed independently by the authors.  We are indebted to the able research 
assistance of Tim Coakley and Kalyan Machiraju.   
 
 2 
 
Generic Competition and Market Exclusivity in Pharmaceuticals 
I. Introduction 
It has been asserted that pharmaceutical products have been enjoying increasing 
periods of freedom from generic competition.  For example, some pharmaceutical 
industry critics suggest that the average “patent life” of new drugs has increased, and in 
some cases “doubled,” since the 1980s.  (NIHCM Foundation, 2000)  These arguments, 
however, are not an accurate way of determining the amount of time a brand name drug 
is on the market before generic competition.  The more accurate approach is the market 
exclusivity period (MEP), or the amount of time the brand name pharmaceutical is on the 
market before generic competition. 
This paper examines actual market exclusivity periods for new drugs experiencing 
first generic competition in the past decade.  We find that generic competitors are 
challenging brand name pharmaceuticals at a variety of sales levels; and that after the 
first generic entry, there is still a market for additional generic competitors.  In addition, 
we find that since 2002, there has been a large number of “blockbuster” drugs with 
premarket sales in excess of $1 billion exposed to generic competition for the first time, 
and their average market exclusivity has declined significantly compared to the 
blockbuster NMEs experiencing entry prior to 2002.  A complementary analysis of drugs 
first launched in the 1980s did not reveal any MEPs from this period that had both large 
commercial sales and the absence of generic competition in 2005.  
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II. Background and Data Samples 
 
Generic entry is regulated under the Hatch-Waxman Act (formally known as the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984).  Title I of the Hatch-
Waxman Act establishes the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) process for 
generic entry.  Under the ANDA requirements, generic firms must demonstrate that their 
drug is bioequivalent, meaning that the rate and extent of availability of the drug at the 
site of action in the body is not significantly different from the innovator’s product.  
Although generic firms have to demonstrate bioequivalence, they do not have to 
reproduce the safety and efficacy data submitted by the original NDA applicant.  The Act 
also allows firms to do their bioequivalence testing and ANDA filings prior to patent 
expiration.  These features allowed generics to enter the market much more quickly than 
was previously the case, usually within a few months of patent expiration.  (CBO, 1998)  
In the pre-Hatch-Waxman period, entry typically didn’t occur until three years or more 
after patent expiration and many commercially significant products did not experience 
any generic entry.  (CBO, 1998) 
 Title II of the Hatch-Waxman Act provided for partial restoration of the patent 
time lost during the regulatory review and clinical testing period.  Since firms typically 
apply for patents prior to the beginning of human testing, much of the nominal 20-year 
patent term is lost during the lengthy pre-market development period for a new drug.  
(DiMasi, et. al., 2003)  The Law provides a formula for restoring part of the lost time on 
one patent, but it also constrains extensions to a maximum effective patent life (EPL) of    6/21/06 3:43 PM
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14 years, and caps the length of restoration at five years (even if this yields a maximum 
effective patent life of less than 14 years).1  
 When filing an ANDA, generic firms must make one of four patent certifications.  
These are referred to as Paragraph I, II, III, and IV certifications.  In particular; 1) that the 
drug has not been patented; or 2) that the patent has already expired; or 3) the date on 
which the patent will expire, and that the generic will not go on the market until that date 
passes; or 4) that the patent is not infringed or is invalid.  (Mossinghoff, 1999)  The 
Hatch-Waxman Act awards a 180-day exclusivity period to the first generic firm (or 
firms) that files, and maintains, a paragraph IV patent challenge.  There is a data 
exclusion provision prohibiting generic firms from submitting an application for a 
generic drug that relies on innovator safety and efficacy for five years from approval of 
any innovator drug containing a new molecular entity.  (The period shrinks to four years 
if the generic drug application is submitted with a Paragraph IV certification.)  The Law 
also now provides for one stay of up to 30 months on the approval of an ANDA while 
legal proceedings with respect to patent infringement and validity, are ongoing at the trial 
court level.  (Padden and Jenkins, 2004)2  The number of patent suits associated with 
paragraph IV filings has grown dramatically in recent years.  (Grabowski, 2004)   
 While several studies have attempted to estimate market exclusivity periods based 
on the filings of the innovator’s patents in the Orange Book, MEPs are determined by a 
complex interaction of technical, regulatory, and competitive factors.  In particular, 
market exclusivity periods are influenced by the innovator’s patent filings, its clinical and 
regulatory review time before FDA approval, the eligibility for patent term restoration, 
the ability of generic firms to circumvent or successfully challenge in court the 
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innovator’s patents, and the length of time that the generic firm incurs in obtaining its 
ANDA approval at the FDA.   
 In this paper, we undertake an analysis of market exclusivity periods for the drug 
products that have recently experienced generic competition.  IMS provided us data that 
enabled us to calculate market exclusivity periods (MEPs) for all drug products first 
experiencing generic competition in the period 1995 to 2005.  This included data for new 
molecular entities (NMEs) as well as data on new formulations (e.g. controlled release 
formulations and combination drugs.  New dosage strengths are not treated as separate 
observations).   
 The objective of the analysis is to examine what variables affect MEP and how 
MEPs have been changing over time.  To the extent that we are obtaining observations 
from a stable distribution over time, this analysis can give insights into what the 
distribution of MEPs is likely to be for NMEs experiencing generic competition in the 
next several years.  However, it is appropriate to consider how various developments 
could affect future MEPs.  In particular, the increasing number of Paragraph IV 
challenges may lead to shorter market exclusivity periods in future time periods.  The big 
upsurge in patent challenges in recent years is concentrated at earlier stages in the 
lifecycle than previously was the case.   (Grabowski, 2004)  Hence, this has the potential 
to significantly shorten MEPs in the future.  These developments would not be fully 
reflected in the data examined here.   
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III.  Analysis of Data and Trends   
 
A. Sample characteristics 
 The sample consists of 251 drug products that experienced generic competition 
between January 1995 and December 2005.  The sample includes 147 new molecular 
entities and 104 new product formulations (e.g. combinations, controlled release delivery 
systems, injectibles, etc.).3    A new formulation is treated as separate observation from 
the new molecular entity with the same active ingredient.  This is based on both supply 
and demand side considerations.  To gain market entry, new formulations typically must 
undergo additional clinical trials (although perhaps only comparative bioavailability  
studies) and a new FDA regulatory approval process.  On the demand side of the market, 
managed care organizations also do a new review and often give different formulary 
status to a new formulation depending on their judgment of the extent of its therapeutic 
advance and the availability of close substitutes, including generic versions of alternative 
formulations with the same active ingredient.4  In this section, the principal focus is on 
NMEs but results for all drug products are presented for comparison purposes.   
 
B. MEPs by market size categories   
 In Figure 1 we display the market exclusivity periods (MEPs) by market size 
categories.  We categorize drugs experiencing generic competition by their annual sales 
in the year prior to generic entry.  The market size categories are less than $50 million, 
$50 - $100 million, $100 – $250 million, $250 - $500 million, and greater than $500 
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million.5  All sales are measured in constant 2005 dollars using the CPI –U as the market 
deflator.   
There is an inverse relationship between market size and MEPs.  The NMEs in 
the two smallest size categories have the longest MEPs with averages of approximately 
15 years.  By contrast, the average MEPs for market size categories above $100 million 
are in the 10.5 to 12.5 year range.  The results for all drugs are qualitatively similar but 
average MEPs are somewhat smaller in value than for the sample of only NMEs.   
One finding that is surprising is the relatively large number of NMEs with small 
market sales experiencing initial generic competition during the 1995-2005 period.  The 
results in Table 1 show that 54 of 147 NMEs experiencing initial generic entry had sales 
of less than $50 million and more than half of the sample (77 NMEs) had sales of less 
than $100 million.  The large number of NMEs experiencing generic entry with small 
annual sales appears to reflect a broadening of the business model of generic firms.  In 
particular, they are extending their focus beyond blockbuster and commercially 
significant entities to targeting NMEs in the niche sales category.   
 On economic grounds, generic firms have incentives to focus on being early 
entrants into markets with large revenues (Scott Morton, 1999); (Grabowski and Vernon 
1992).  One would expect entry into niche markets would occur as generic firms broaden 
their portfolio and this could occur well after the date of patent expiration.  This is 
consistent with the observation that there are many outliers with very long MEPs in the 
case of the NMEs with sales below $100 million, but not those NMEs with larger sales 
(discussed further below).  Hence, it would seem reasonable to hypothesize that the 
MEPs are larger for NMEs with small sales because of longer intervals between patent 
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expiration and the onset of generic competition.  We don’t think it is because the EPL for 
these smaller selling drugs is longer.   
 In Figure 2 we present the average number of generic entrants after one year of 
generic competition for drugs of varying market sales.  As expected, greater market sales 
draws more generic entrants within the first year of generic competition.  In particular, 
markets with less than $50 million in market sales have less than two generic competitors 
after Year 1, whereas markets with sales greater than $500 million have more than seven 
generic competitors.  However, even markets with sales of $50-100 million averaged 
between two and three generics within one year of generic entry.  These results are 
consistent with several studies by economists that product sales is a key determinant of 
generic entry and competition (Grabowski and Vernon, 1992) (Scott Morton, 1999) 
(Reiffen and Ward, 2002).   
 
C. Time Trends and Frequency Distributions 
Figure 3A presents the average yearly MEP values for NMEs, categorized by year 
of first generic entry.  The figure also shows the number of NMEs experiencing initial 
generic entry in each year for the 1995 to 2005 period.  There is a strong upward trend in 
the annual number of NMEs subject to generic competition for the first time.  The period 
2000 to 2005 had an average of 16 NMEs subject to generic competition for the first time 
compared to 10 NMEs in the 1995 to 1999 period.   
The average MEPs in Figure 3A fluctuate generally within a range of 12 to 15 
years.  There is no discernible trend in MEPs over the 1995 to 2005 period.  However, 
given that the group of NMEs with relatively small sales comprise a large and expanding 
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share of NMEs in our sample, it is also appropriate to consider various sub-samples of 
NMEs on this issue.   
Figure 3B considers the category of NMEs with sales greater than $100 million.  
This reduces the sample size by roughly one-half.  However, the NMEs with sales greater 
than $100 million account for more than 90% of the drug sales first exposed to generic 
competition over the 1995 to 2005 period.  This reflects the skewed distribution of 
pharmaceutical sales. (Grabowski, Vernon, and DiMasi, 2002) (Grabowski, 2004).   
 Figure 3B shows the average annual MEPs for NMEs with sales greater than $100 
million.  The average MEPs for each year are generally lower than for the full sample of 
NMEs.  For example, the average MEPs for the 2003 to 2005 period are approximately 
11 years in Figure 3B, compared to 13 years in Figure 3A.  There is also less variability 
in year-to-year fluctuations than in Figure 3A.  The frequency distributions for MEPs are 
considered below.  They indicate a significant number of long-tail observations (MEPs 
greater than 20 years) for NMEs with less than $100 million in market sales.  This is not 
the case for NMEs with sales above $100 million.   
As in the case of the complete NME sample, there is a decided upward trend in 
the annual number of NMEs with sales greater than $100 million that are first exposed to 
generic competition.  This is reflected in Figure 3B by the fact that the period 1995 
through 1999 had an average of only three drugs experiencing initial generic competition.  
By comparison, the period 2000 through 2005 had an average of nine NMEs 
experiencing initial generic competition.   
An analysis of the frequency distributions confirms the presence of several 
outliers for the sample of NMEs with sales less than $100 million.  In particular, there are 
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17 NMEs with MEPs greater than 20 years.  This is shown in Figure 4A.  By contrast 
there are only three such NMEs with an MEP greater than 20 years in the distribution of 
NMEs with sales greater than $100 million (Figure 4B).  Furthermore, the latter 
distribution has a much higher percentage of the NMEs with relatively short MEPs.  In 
particular, 30 of the 70 NMEs (43%) with sales greater than $100 million have ten years 
or less of market exclusivity, compared to 17 of 77 NMEs (22%) with sales less than 
$100 million.  The results are unchanged qualitatively if we include all drug products in 
the analysis rather than only NMEs.   
 
D. The Blockbuster Sales Category of NMEs 
 Given the highly skewed distribution of returns for NMEs, it is also relevant to 
focus on drugs in the very high end of the sales distribution.  In particular, Grabowski, 
Vernon, and DiMasi (2002) have analyzed the distribution of returns to various cohorts of 
NMEs introduced between 1970 and 1994.  They find that the top ten percent of NMEs 
ranked by sales account for more than 50% of the total value for all NME introductions.  
These “high value,” or blockbuster, NMEs are frequently first-in-class or best-in-class 
new product entrants in markets with many potential patients and unmet medical needs.  
(Grabowski, Vernon, & DiMasi, 2002)  In addition to the importance of these entities 
from a therapeutic standpoint, innovators are critically dependent on the revenues from 
these top decile compounds to earn a positive return on their overall portfolio.  At the 
same time, health sector payors look to generic entry for these products to generate 
significant price competition and savings in their drug budgets.  It is therefore appropriate 
to analyze the category of NMEs that have sales above industry benchmarks, for 
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example,  of a billion dollars or more in the year prior to generic entry, given the special 
importance of these entities to innovators, patients, and payors,  . 
 In Figure 5, the top panel shows the number of billion dollar NMEs experiencing 
first generic entry in two sub-periods of our sample.  In particular, from 1995 through 
2001, there were only two such NMEs first exposed to generic competition—Zantac in 
1997 and Prozac in 2001.  However, in the four year period since 2002, there have been 
eight of these billion dollar NMEs experiencing initial generic competition.  Hence, this 
has been a several-fold increase in the number of blockbuster products recently exposed 
to generic competition. 
 The lower panel in Figure 5 shows the mean MEP for the billion dollar products 
in the two periods.  For the two products experiencing first generic competition prior to 
2001, the market exclusivity period averaged just under 14.0 years.  By comparison, the 
eight products experiencing first generic competition since 2002 had an average MEP of 
11.2 years.  (Moreover, if one excludes the two antibiotic drugs from this calculation, the 
average MEP for the six remaining drugs is only 9.4 years.)6  These recent values for 
MEP represent relatively short product life cycle return periods for products that typically 
take more than a decade to develop and whose sales revenues are critical to the returns to 
R&D for the overall portfolio of new drug introductions.7   
 It is relevant to mention that all but a few of these billion dollar drugs over the 
1995 to 2005 period have been subject to paragraph IV challenges by generic firms.  The 
fact that these challenges are now occurring earlier in the product life cycle may be one 
of the significant factors explaining the tendency toward shorter MEPs in recent years.  
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This is an important general topic for further research, that is considered further in the 
next section.   
 
IV. Regression Analysis 
 
 In order to examine the specific effects on MEP of factors like product size or 
paragraph IV patent challenges, we estimated a multi-variable regression model.  The 
unit of observation is the 251 drug products in our sample that first experienced generic 
competition between 1995 and 2005.  The results are presented in Table 2. 
  The key independent variables of interest in Table 2 are the sales of the product 
at the time of generic entry, and whether the product is subject to a paragraph IV 
challenge.  In addition, control variables are also included for the type of product (i.e., 
NME, new formulation, or combination oral contraceptive) and its mode of 
administration (oral, injectible, or other form of administration).  We also included 
control variables on the year of first generic entry and a product’s therapeutic class (i.e. 
cardiovascular, anti-infective, etc.) in a stepwise fashion in some of the alternative 
specifications.   
 We utilize a logarithmic specification on this variable, given the non-linear effect 
observed in the descriptive statistics earlier (Figure 1).  The results in Table 2 indicate 
that products with larger sales have shorter MEPs.  The log size variable is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  These results reinforce the findings illustrated in 
Figure 1 that products with significant sales (for example, the above $100 million 
benchmark) have shorter MEPs than their smaller selling counterparts.     
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 A second basic finding of interest is that drugs experiencing a paragraph IV 
challenge had MEPs that were on average about 1.5 years shorter in value than the 
products without such a challenge.  This variable is subject to somewhat larger standard 
errors than the log size variable.  However, it is still statistically significant (at the 10% 
level) in two of three specifications.  These larger standard errors probably reflect the fact 
that our information does not allow us to know whether the patent challenge was 
successful or not.  This introduces some noise into this variable.  Also, paragraph IV 
challenges were distributed across many different points of time in the product life cycle 
for the drug products in our 1995 to 2005 sample period, whereas more recent patent suits 
are concentrated much earlier after product approvals.  (Grabowski, 2004)   
Generic firms are increasingly pursuing a “prospecting” approach and 
undertaking patent challenges of major products early in the product life cycle.  Even if 
the probability of overturning the patent is low, the rewards associated with six month 
exclusivity are large compared to the legal costs incurred.  As discussed, the FDA will 
accept a paragraph IV ANDA application four years after NDA approval for an NME (in 
particular one year before the expiration of the five-year exclusivity period).  At this 
point in time, multiple generic challenges often occur, triggering intensive legal battles 
over patent infringement and validity.  Given the large number of ongoing suits at the 
present time which are concentrated at earlier points in the product life cycle, paragraph 
IV challenges could result in significantly shorter MEPs in the future.  (Grabowski, 2004)  
This remains an important issue for further research.  
The other variables included in the regressions suggest that new molecular entities 
have MEPs that are longer, on average, than new formulations or combination oral 
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contraceptives.  Similarly, injectibles have MEPs that are a few years longer than oral 
drugs or ones with other modes of administration.  The year in which first generic entry 
occurred is included in the alternative specifications (2) and (3).  There is no systematic 
trend observed in these coefficient estimates, except for a tendency for earlier and later 
years of the sample to exhibit lower MEPs.   
 The regressions in column 3 of Table 2 also include the therapeutic class indicator 
variables (12 classes in all) present as control variables.  While some of the therapeutic 
class indicator variables are statistically significant, these variables as a group add little 
explanatory power.  This may result from the fact that the classes are necessarily defined 
very broadly.8   
 
V. Long-Tail MEPs: An Analysis of 1980-89 NME Introductions 
 
One possible critique of our analysis is, given that the drugs are categorized by 
year of initial generic introduction, there is the possibility that the sample is right 
censored.   In particular, there may be some molecules with very long tail MEPs that 
currently have no generic competition.  As discussed, our results do pick up a number of 
outliers of very old drugs first facing generic competition in the last ten years.  They are 
strongly concentrated in the distribution of NMEs with sales less than $100 million.   
In order to examine the issue of long tail MEPs in a systemic manner, we did a 
complementary analysis of generic competition for new molecular entities (NMEs) 
introduced in the 1980 to 1989 period.  This sample of drugs has been on the market 
between 15 and 25 years.  The sample of 1980 to 1989 launches allows us to examine the 
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extent of generic competition for products that are now in the mature phase of their life 
cycles.  We wish to investigate in particular whether there are any products with long tail 
MEPs that have significant product sales but no current generic competition.   
Several major commercial products introduced between 1980 and 1989 (e.g., 
Zantac, Prozac, Zestril and Prinivil, Vasotec, Pepcid, etc.) are already present in our 
sample of drug products that experienced initial generic competition in the 1995 – 2005 
period (i.e., Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 1 through 4).  The MEPs for these products had 
effective patent lives in the 10 to 15 year range and hence experienced generic 
competition before the December 2005 endpoint of our sample.  The analysis in this 
section allows us to look systematically at MEPs by the date of first market launch rather 
than the date of initial generic competition.  It therefore provides a look at MEPs from a 
different perspective and should illuminate the issue of long-tail MEPs in particular.   
The 1980-89 NME introduction sample included in this analysis is discussed in 
more detail in Grabowski and Vernon (1994) (2000).  Essentially it is a comprehensive 
sample of 167 NMEs that were introduced between 1980 and 1989.  The sample 
considered here explicitly excludes biologicals because no Hatch-Waxman generic 
regulatory pathway currently exists for these entities.  It also excludes a handful of drugs 
developed for diseases more prevalent in developing countries, such as malaria and 
schistosomiasis, since these drugs have negligible U. S. sales (i.e., they do not register 
enough U.S. sales to be included in the IMS audits of drug products).   
A summary analysis of our findings on the extent of generic competition for 
1980-1989 launches is presented in Table 3.  Column 1 shows the number of NME 
introductions by year and column 2 shows how many of these NMEs are still active or 
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marketed in the United States in 2005.  This analysis indicates that 130 of the 167 NMEs 
remain active while 37 NMEs introduced in 1980-1989 have been discontinued or 
withdrawn, generally for economic reasons (i.e., product obsolescence and insufficient 
market sales).  Column 3 of Table 3 shows that the vast majority of active compounds 
have generic competitors.  In particular, it indicates that 106 of the 130 active NMEs 
have experienced generic competition by late 2005 (82%).  Viewed from the perspective 
of market size in the pre-generic entry period, drug products representing 94% of sales 
for the 1985 to 1989 NME sample are now subject to generic competition.  The 
comparable figure for the 1980 to 1984 sample of NMEs is over 99 percent.9   
Table 4 provides a listing of the drugs without generic competition.  A further 
analysis of existing intellectual property (IP) protection for these 24 NMEs was 
conducted using the FDA’s Electronic Orange Book database, and for antibiotic drugs, 
the PTO’s database of awarded patents.10  Twenty of the 24 had no patent or exclusivity 
in 2005; only four of these NMEs (Marinol, Azactam, Novantrone and Iopidine) have 
any patent or drug exclusivity IP protection still applicable in 2005.  Furthermore, the IP 
protection for three of these four compounds is limited to a specific indication on the 
basis of a use patent or orphan drug exclusivity.  The fourth compound, Azactam, has 
only a process patent listed in the PTO database.  Also, Table 3 shows that these drugs 
without generic competition are heavily concentrated in the last half of the period – over 
half are in the last four years.  
The main reason for the lack of generic competition for the 24 compounds listed 
in Table 4 is primarily economic in nature.  In particular, it reflects the small market size 
exhibited by the vast majority of these products.  Table 4 shows the 2004 sales for each 
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of these compounds.  Only 5 of the 24 compounds have sales in excess of $50 million, 
whereas 15 of 24 compounds had sales below $10 million in 2004.  Primaxin, an 
injectible antibiotic introduced in December 1985, is the largest selling drug without 
generic competition.  It had sales just under $200 million dollars in 2004.  The four 
products with IP protection still remaining had relatively modest sales levels in 2004 (i.e. 
three of these four products had sales between $50 and $150 million and the fourth had 
sales less than $10 million).   
A key conclusion of the analysis in this section, therefore, is that there are no long 
tail MEPs from the sample of 1980-1989 NME introductions with large commercial 
sales.11  We also find that more than 80% of the new drug introductions of the 1980s that 
are still active now have generic competitors (more than 90% in terms of pre-generic 
market sales).  This is consistent with our prior findings on the increasing breadth of 
generic entry for even categories of drugs with small market sales at the time of patent 
expiration.   
 
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Our results provide the first study to our knowledge on actual MEPs for drugs 
facing generic competition over the past decade.  One of the key findings is that generic 
competition has intensified over the 1995 to 2005 period.  There are a larger number of 
drugs experiencing initial generic entry and generic competition now encompasses even 
very modest selling drugs.  The results on generic competition were also particularly 
striking for blockbuster NMEs, a category which was constructed based on sales of over 
 18 
$1 billion in the year prior to generic entry.  In particular, the number of such blockbuster 
drugs first exposed to generic competition has increased several fold since 2002 while 
their average MEP declined significantly compared with that for the blockbuster products 
experiencing initial generic competition in the period before 2002.   
Based on a multi-variable regression analysis, we find that the MEPs for small 
selling drugs are significantly longer than those of larger selling drugs.  Second, our 
results indicate that drug products subject to paragraph IV challenge have MEPs that are 
approximately 1.5 years shorter on average than products without such challenges 
(whether the patent challenge was successful or not).  This is an important issue for 
further research, given that recent patent challenges are occurring much earlier in the 
product life cycle than previously was the case.   
We also performed a complementary analysis on generic competition for drugs 
that were introduced in the 1980 to 1989 period.  In this analysis we wanted to investigate 
whether there are any commercially significant long tail MEPs currently without generic 
competition and if so whether this was due to IP protection.  We found that over 80% of 
still active NMEs had experienced generic competition by 2005.  Furthermore, only four 
of the 24 compounds without generic competition in 2005 had any patent or exclusivity 
listing in the FDA’s Orange Book.  The primary reason for an absence of generic 
competition for the relatively few drugs that were still sole sourced was economic.  In 
particular, more than half of these 24 compounds had sales below $10 million in 2005, 
and none had sales in excess of $200 million.  We did not find any commercially 
significant long tail MEPs in this sample of older drug introductions.   
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End Notes 
 
1 Effective patent life is defined as the time from FDA approval to patent expiration.   
 
2 The innovator has 45 days from receipt of notice of paragraph IV certification to 
initiate legal proceedings in order to trigger the 30-month stay.  (The stay can be 
shortened or lengthened by the court in certain cases.)   
 
3 A special category of new formulations is combination hormonal contraceptives 
(CHCs) which represent different combinations of progesterone and estrogen.  These 
products also have bioequivalent generics that are marketed as “branded generics.”  
Given the distinguishing characteristics, CHCs are treated as a special class of new 
formulations in the regression analysis in Table 2.   
 
4 In some instances, new formulations have increased market share compared to the 
original NME, and achieved a much higher number of prescriptions (e.g. controlled 
release calcium channel blockers and controlled release oxycodone).  In other 
instances, new formulations have achieved little market penetration compared to the 
original NME (e.g. controlled release versions of diazepem and fluoxetine).   
 
5 These categories were chosen because they have roughly the same number of NMEs 
in the categories above the base case with the smallest market sales.   
 
6 Antibiotics is a class which has shorter mean development times (DiMasi, 
Grabowski, and Vernon 2004) and correspondingly also tend to exhibit longer 
effective patent lifetimes.  The two antibiotic products in our sample of blockbuster 
NMEs were Augmentin and Cipro.  These two  products had the highest MEP values 
for this category of blockbuster NMEs with values of 17.9 and 15.6 years, 
respectively.   
 
7 We also used $500 million in U.S. sales (measured in the year prior to generic entry) 
as the threshold for blockbuster status.  The results were qualitatively similar.  In 
particular, there were 14 such NMEs in 2002-2005, compared to eight NMEs in 
1995-2001.  The average MEP was 12.2 years in the 2002-2005 period (11.4 years) 
excluding the two antibiotics, Cipro and Augmentin) compared to the 13.5 years 
before the 1998 to 2001 period.   
 
8 Specification (3) has the most parameters to be estimated and the corresponding 
highest R2 (the percent of overall explained variance).  At the same time, it has the 
lowest F coefficient.  The F value tests the joint statistical significance of all the 
coefficient estimates included in the equation, appropriately adjusted for degrees of 
freedom.  (Johnson, Johnson, and Buse 1987)   
 
 
 22 
9 The benchmark for this calculation is the level of sales achieved by the NMEs in their 
eighth year of market life.  This is a useful benchmark point of time because it is 
prior to generic entry but represents a point in the product ife cycle where sales are 
typically converging to their market peaks.  (Grabowski and Vernon, 1994; 2000) 
 
10 Since antibiotics were, until 1997, approved under different provisions of law than 
other drugs, they were not subject to the patent listing and certification requirements 
imposed on other drugs by the Hatch-Waxman Act; this difference in regulatory 
status carries over for antibiotics approved prior to the legislative reform that took 
place in 1997.   
 
11 One pre-1980 product introduction with significant market sales is Premarin.  
Potential generic manufacturers have not successfully demonstrated to FDA that they 
have developed a manufacturing process to produce a bioequivalent product to 
Premarin. (HHS News, 1997).   
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Table 1 
 
Number of Drugs Experiencing Generic 
Competition by Market Size 
 
Market Size a NMEs 
 
All Drugs 
< $50 Mil 54 103 
$50 Mil - $100 Mil 23 44 
$100 Mil- $250 Mil 29 46 
$250 Mil - $500 Mil 19 25 
> $500 Mil 22 33 
 
Total 147 251 
 
Notes:   a  Market size is measured by sales revenues (in 2005$) in the 12 
month period prior to first generic entrant.   
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Table 2 
 
Determinants of MEP for Drugs Experiencing First Generic Competition  
Between 1995 – 2005 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
    
Constant 19.36*** 
(3.39) 
17.58*** 
 (3.96) 
15.844*** 
(4.33) 
 
Log of market size (define 
in a footnote?) 
-0.69** 
(0.26) 
-0.71** 
(0.27) 
-0.70** 
(0.28) 
 
Paragraph IV challenge -1.53* 
(0.93) 
-1.60* 
(0.96) 
-1.22 
(0.98) 
 
NME  1.12 
(1.72) 
 1.27 
(1.74) 
 1.66 
(1.18) 
 
New formulation -0.42 
(1.76) 
-0.35 
(1.79) 
 0.47 
(2.28) 
 
Injectible 1.87* 
(1.09) 
 1.55 
(1.11) 
 1.66 
(1.18) 
 
Other administration -0.28 
(1.26) 
-0.98 
(1.30) 
-1.19 
(1.42) 
 
Year of first generic entry 
included  
No Yes Yes 
 
Therapeutic class 
indications included 
No No Yes 
R2 0.08  0.11  0.16 
 
F 3.28  1.80  1.68 
 
[Add footnote describing reference groups omitted from the equation, i.e., Oral, 
Combination oral contraceptives] 
Notes:  *** significant at 1%    
 **   significant at 5%    
 *     significant at 10%   
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Table 3 
 
Current Generic Competition for 1980-1989 New Molecular Entity Introductions 
 
 
 
 
Year NMEs NMEs Still Active NMEs With 
Generic 
Competition 
NMEs Without 
Generic 
Competition 
1980 8 5 4 1 
1981 17 12 12 0 
1982 19 15 13 2 
1983 15 12 10 2 
1984 16 11 11 0 
1985 16 11 8 3 
1986 21 17 13 4 
1987 19 16 13 2 
1988 14 12 7 5 
1989 22 19 15 4 
     
Total 167 130 106 24 
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Table 4 
 
1980-89 NME Introductions That Don’t Have Generic Competition in 2005 
Product Intro date 
2004 
($mil) Sales Patent or Exclusivity 
Cloderm June 1980 4.3 No 
Emcyt April 1982 6.0 No 
Zanosar September 1982 1.1 No 
Lithostat August 1983 0.2 No 
Cefizox September 1983 3.2 No 
Orap January 1985 4.1 No 
Ridaura June 1985 4.9 No 
Primaxin December 1985 197.1 No 
Syprine April 1986 0.5 No 
Cefotan May 1986 40.1 No 
Marinol August 1986 135.9 Yes1 
Noroxin November 1986 6.7 No 
Doral January 1987 1.6 No 
Azactam February 1987 56.0 Yes2 
Cyklokapron June 1987 1.4 No 
Novantrone March 1988 82.4 Yes3 
Maxair May 1988 61.2 No 
Iopidine May 1988 7.7 Yes4 
Naftin May 1988 16.7 No 
Levatol December 1988 2.5 No 
Nimotop March 1989 24.7 No 
Oxistat April 1989 13.7 No 
Suprax June 1989 5.6 No 
Ethamolin June 1989 2.3 No 
 Notes  
1.  Use patent for anorexia associated with weight loss in AIDS patients; expires 
February 2011.   
2.  Process patent #5,194,604 for process and intermediates for beta lactams having 
aminothiazole acetic acid sidechains; expires June 2010.   
3.  Use patent for a method of inducing regression of leukemia cell growth; expires April 
2006.   
4.  Use patent for controlling or preventing post-operative intraocular pressure rises 
associated with ophthalmic laser surgical procedures; expires May 2010.   
 
 
 
   6/21/06 4:04 PM
Comment: Update or explain the April 2006 
expiration. 
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Figure 1   
 
 
 
[Add “Average” to vertical axis label]
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Figure 2 
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Figure 5- 
 
 
 
